Syed ali khamenei with ahmadinejad monkey

Monkey Cage.

Few could have imagined two years ago that the man who caused a Tehran spring that nearly brought down the Iranian regime, only for it to be saved by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, would today be reduced to political impotence. But after a three-month conflict, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad should be grateful Khamenei has not ordered his arrest, and, at least for now, is content for him to serve out his term as a lame duck.

As this battle has unfolded, important lessons about the workings and dysfunction of the Iranian political and theological system have emerged. Like the two presidents before him, Ahmadinejad made the mistake of assuming Iranian presidents have power. He also incorrectly assumed that, because of his once special relationship with Khamenei, who had placed his full weight and legitimacy behind Ahmadinejad when it appeared his re-election in June was rigged, he could exploit his position to appoint his loyalists to key political posts — while dismissing others he deemed to be his foes.

No matter how much some clerics in the past supported Ahmadinejad, once Khamenei made clear his decision to effectively strip the president of his powers, the clergy placed their full support behind the supreme leader. Some Iran experts have written that the battle is over divergent interpretations of Shia theology.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said he would join the monkey, mouse, turtle and worms that Iran had sent into space, although his remarks betrayed a hint of nerves at the.

This is placing a sophisticated mask over what is really a dirty and raw political struggle. Simply put, Khamenei could not permit a president to defy his orders, make political appointments unilaterally without the consent of various ministries, and pout at home for 11 days in a disappearing act to demonstrate his anger at the supreme leader.

Ahmadinejad wanted to build his own network in key ministries that would be loyal only to him, not to Khamenei, in order to ensure the election of candidates belonging to his political faction when parliamentary and presidential polls are held in and , respectively. Ahmadinejad was grooming Mashaei as his replacement, despite the loathing directed at him by the clerical establishment.

According to high-level sources in Tehran, Mashaei may soon follow in the long line of Ahmadinejad loyalists who have been arrested. While there is ample evidence to suggest that Ahmadinejad has support within the IRGC — some commanders openly endorsed his candidacy in — they did not step in to save him. In fact, former commanders in key political posts, such as Tehran mayor Mohammad Qalibaf, have sided openly with Khamenei in the dispute.

As the points listed above show, what matters most to political elites governing the Islamic republic is regime survival. Ahmadinejad became a threat to this survival.